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Analytical Standards in the Intelligence Community: Are
Standards Professionalized Enough?
Abstract
Analytical standards and its impact is a topic compelling the U.S. Intelligence Community
(IC) toward a discipline of proficiency and structure comparable to other professional fields
is an evolutionary process. Following the creation of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs) became the feature through
which guidance and a consensus on a topic became methods of aligning entities within the
IC. The research questions about the usefulness of ODNI’s ICDs on the individual analyst
and IC member agencies as the intelligence profession emerges are intriguing. Therefore,
practitioners should consider several approaches and criteria to evaluate analytical
standards. This article outlines methods for determining the analytical standards and the
impact standards creation has had on intelligence analysis, furthering the professional
development of the discipline through a qualitative methodology using a descriptive and
explanatory approach based on an organizational theory foundation. Using multiple case
studies and a structured approach evidence supports the creation of standards while
examining the various professional structures that can provide guidance.
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Introduction
Critics continually appraise intelligence analysis for the need to evaluate
itself on accuracy, timeliness, insightfulness, objectivity, and relevancy
according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
website.1 Since the terrorist attacks upon the United States on September
11, 2001, the ODNI’s office has since endeavored to align the Intelligence
Community (IC). However, the office has somewhat unclear
responsibilities and authorities with little actual control and direct
oversight over the 18 entities, including the ODNI, that make up the IC.2
However, despite a clear description of control, the issuance of Intelligence
Community Directives (ICDs) may have similar effect to other fields such
as medicine, law, and library science as the profession matures as a
discipline. There is a paucity of research about the ODNI’s influence on IC
analysis and its transformation from a vocation to a profession through
new principles and guidelines.3 Due to the limited range of the ODNI’s
responsibilities, analytical standards fall in a range of applicability,
previously based on individual organizations, which were open to
interpretation. Therefore, the question this research will answer is how has
the ODNI been effective in its effort to improve intelligence analysis across
the IC? Furthermore, as the IC becomes a professional discipline with
analytic standardization, practitioners can determine the effect of IC
analytical prowess and improvement since the creation of the ODNI by
emulating practices employed in other disciplines.

Literature Review
ODNI Limitations - Responsibility Without Authority
Preceding the establishment of the ODNI, most prior standards studies
took a comparative approach assessing analytical standards of the IC as a
whole. The effects of creating guidelines that came with the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) were intended to
apply to the entire IC.4 ODNI was also envisioned to head and speak for
the IC to the President, manage the National Intelligence Program (NIP)
with no direct control over full allocation efforts, which contends with the
Secretary of Defense, create intelligence priorities that are understood and
achievable for analysts, and oversee the IC in general regarding a number
of topics.5 Previously, with Executive Order 12333, the Director of Central
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Intelligence (DCI) had two main principal issues, which took 50 years to
the eventual switch from aligning under the ODNI as a centralized
organization.6 The two issues consisted of conflicting interests, with the
DCI having "responsibilities as both the nominal head of the intelligence
community as a whole and as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, one
of the agencies in that community.”7 The ODNI has attempted to clarify
issues by issuing various ICDs, including ICD 203.8 However, the ODNI
does not have clearly defined responsibilities or control for much of its
oversight.
As Harknett and Stever described, the agency was originally meant as a
transformative agency over time, but not enough effort was placed toward
this impact and therefore resulted in the agency being more “visionary”
overall.9 Without full control and publicly available intelligence
appropriations, ODNI is still at the mercy of covert funding departments
as the agencies are required to disperse their own budgets through these
apportionment limitations.10 From a DoD perspective, IRTPA only
“provides extensive budgetary and management authorities over these
agencies to the DNI, it does not revoke the responsibilities of the Secretary
of Defense for these agencies.”11 Because of overlapping roles with DoD,
decisions by the DNI require a certain amount of “close coordination and
cooperation” with multiple agencies. Shared decision making processes
can eventually devolve into turf wars, as has been seen throughout the IC
even before the ODNI.12
Harknett and Stever echoed this sentiment, while adding that ODNI “does
not have the power to implement structural reforms,” even though that
was originally what the act’s intention was proposed to create.13 As Clark
asserted, “Congress still had not bestowed the DNI with enough authority
to control and unify” the individual agencies that make up the IC.14
Therefore, some IC leaders view the ODNI’s role as one of coordination
and facilitation, vice the leader of the IC.15 As a roadblock to itself, others
IC leaders feel the ODNI needs to "overcome entrenched bureaucratic
mindsets, enforce vague authorities, demonstrate added value, and rapidly
adapt to the diffuse threat environment of the post-9/11 world."16
Furthermore, Marcoci et al. have described the effectiveness of policy
enacted, as:
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"further research is required to provide a comprehensive evaluation
of the success of IRTPA and ODNI’s Analytic Integrity and
Standards (AIS) office in creating a reliable and valid quality
control process for the IC."17
Formalization from Craft into Profession
However, a professionalization discussion of the ODNI enables a new
perspective for comparison to other disciplines despite its limitations.
After the ODNI’s creation, it focused on training while maintaining the
context of professionalization. Analysts now present both craft and
profession since craft requires understanding a skill acquired through
experience and learning. At the same time, analysts represent a profession
due to the vast knowledge its practitioners provide and a tangible benefit
that can be passed on to new employees through structured
methodologies, such as educational training.18 Previously, the IC had been
managed by individual agencies under general SECDEF guidance as a craft
instead of a profession. As a result,
intelligence analysis has neither well defined systemic formal
knowledge—such as a coherent doctrine or theory—nor standards
that are formulated or enforced by other members of the
profession. Knowledge regarding intelligence analysis methods has
not been cumulative, and the various attempts to improve
organizational performance have remained isolated from other
efforts.19
Marrin further explained that intelligence “spontaneously” began to move
toward formal structuring practices within a few areas with the idea that a
focus on topics, such as ethics and certification, must be addressed before
assessing personal or organizational performance.20 In addition, Marrin
asserted, "the broader professionalization process is an effort to formalize
some of these other factors."21
As a whole, managers administered the IC in a near indiscriminate
manner prior to ICD 203, while still providing untold results, as the
successes are closely held and rarely shared, while failures become news of
the day.22 The various agencies have had training of many kinds. However,
IC leadership, U.S. policymakers, and the individuals who review the
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information are familiar with the analytic pitfalls that plague intelligence
analysts. For example, "under time pressure with information that is
incomplete, ambiguous, and sometimes deliberately deceptive, analysts
become vulnerable to a wide range of well-known sources of analytic
error."23 The use of the ICDs, structured analytical techniques (SATs), and
understanding the psychology of bias helps "sidestep some of the known
analytic pitfalls, and explicitly confront the problems associated with
unquestioned mental models or mindsets."24
Professional Standards
Various other tradecrafts and professions include characteristics where
scholars point to an analogy that is comparable and can be useful for the
IC when "developing or legitimizing, formal professional standards for
analysts," which is something the ODNI has attempted to start.25 A
significant factor at the national level is creating wide-reaching standards
with analysts’ input, while allowing for considerations of other aspects of
professionalization such as the training initiatives, personal development,
joint duty assignments, and including a code of ethics similar to other
professional disciplines such as medicine, law, and library science. While
change occurs in some areas,
"the downside of this kind of top-down professionalization process
is that it would likely be evolutionary by building on programs and
practices already in existence and would not provide a mechanism
for improving intelligence analysis at the state or local levels or in
private industry."26
Moreover, Dr. Greaves has previously argued for the creation a new
expanded discipline of "Strategic Security, which consists of three subdisciplines of intelligence, counterterrorism, and protection,” and that
standards are a requirement to increase the IC’s capability to answer
security threats against a broad range of issues.27
The 2007 uniform standards of ICD 203 also enabled the body of analysts
aspire to work toward professionalization. Researchers, such as Bruce and
George, point out "one hallmark of any profession is that members adhere
to common rules governing the conduct of professional duties."28 Before
the ICD 203 mandate, most agencies taught and enforced its tailored
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guidance for products, which intensified bias within an organization, and
precipitated a "reluctance to acknowledge the quality of work done by
analysts in other IC components."29 Of the assigned responsibilities under
IRTPA conferred upon the ODNI, Fingar points out that "none is more
important…than the mandate to integrate the IC."30 Under the IRTPA,
Congress mandated the ODNI to set standards for training, career
developments, and educational programs for the IC by consulting with the
individual agencies to tailor specifics as needed.31 The mandate for change
was the first unintended step toward moving the IC to become a
professional discipline. ICD 203 also helps establish basic tradecraft,
which focuses on source reliability, addresses uncertainly, and separates
assumptions and analytical judgments into products that can also include
alternative analysis. These aspects of analysis are essential for
professionalism in each discipline.32
For the IC to move toward professionalization mirroring medicine and
law, for example, teachers and trainers need to be able to break down
"the educational infrastructure necessary to improve the analyst's
performance. Furthermore, if a link can be made between the
educational program and increased proficiency, the foundations
then exist to begin requiring that program for all practitioners."33
Educational programs also have a long-standing record of greater
attention paid toward tradecraft efforts while contributing to the sense of
collegiality or fraternity that accumulates.34 Since 2004, IRTPA has
boosted analysts' professionalism. However, Bruce and George agree, "it
will fall well short of developing the kind of analytic cadre that will be
needed to deal with the complexities of an emerging multipolar and highly
dynamic world that the IC anticipates it will be facing."35 Gentry
considered mandated changes will do little to alter individual analysts'
behavior, as there is a disconnect for the reforms to individual analysts
and criticize ODNI's efforts regarding shortfalls in intelligence.36 Coulthart
further asserted although thousands received training, "there is no solid
evidence on how often or why analysts use SATs."37 Therefore, it is
essential to note that, while the ODNI is making progress, researchers
contend the IC itself blocks “core issues” for determining intelligence
excellence since the "structure of independent, confederated agencies,
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with proudly distinct cultures and incentive systems, remains largely
unchanged."38
However, Marcoci, Vercammen, and Burgman claimed the ICDs created
actual change in analytical practices.39 Immerman asserted there were
“radical” and “revolution[ary]” transformations, while Cardillo observed
"codified good analytic tradecraft.”40 Gentry had a “positive” perspective of
the ICDs as well as work with intelligence evaluators for ODNI.41 Due to
the continued discussion of intelligence analysis being a separate
intelligence discipline, few researchers have studied the effects the ODNI
has had in moving IC analysis toward its professional enterprise, creating
standards, or the status of analysts contributing to analysis as a whole
outside of the IC. This study fills the gap prior research failed to assess.

Theoretical Framework and Research Design
This article relies on the bureaucratic perspective of organizational theory
as its theoretical framework because the theory enables an in-depth
narrative about the analytical standards as compared with other
professional disciplines while working toward intelligence
professionalization.42 Manning described that “bureaucracy is just one of
many ways to organize collective human behavior.”43 The hypothesis is the
ODNI's creation of generalized analytical standards for the IC elements,
through ICDs improved intelligence analysis thereby professionalizing the
IC. Based on a descriptive, qualitative case study approach using multiplecase examples, this article presents a contemporary real-world
understanding of other professions that explains various activities of the
ODNI’s move toward professionalism. Punch asserts "a descriptive study
sets out to collect, organize and summarize information about the matter
being studied [while…] an explanatory study, on the other hand, sets out
to explain and account for the descriptive information."44 Therefore, the
case study model using three disciplines as cases—medical, legal, and
librarian or scholar—enables an investigation of in-depth methodologies
for the IC, as a community of organizations, can forge ahead adhering to
policy and guidelines while enabling the practice of intelligence analysis to
be more of a professional discipline it is presently.
Each discipline included in this research excelled at creating a community
of highly functional, ethical, and organized professions, with publications
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for its members. According to a current understanding of the various
fields, the primary researcher assessed each of the three disciplines using
peer-reviewed journals and publications because of the parallel with
professionalizing the intelligence field. Additionally, the primary
researcher will explain the current variations of standards application by
amplifying the measures the ODNI has in place. This strategy provides a
method to understand if analytical standards increase professionalism
across the IC while determining the level of general effectiveness within
published intelligence analysis.
Using "an organization theory approach to the public sector assumes that
it is impossible to understand the content of the public policy and public
decision-making without analyzing how political-administrative systems
are organized and their modes of operation."45 This model's gaps are the
application of the current standard and, by explaining various instances
where the efficiency, productivity, and usefulness of ICDs, helps establish
regular baseline threshold for establishing a professional discipline.
Evidence was taken from secondary literature and peer-reviewed journals
or publications, with some reviews that have already been conducted on
the topic, since each field has its own guidelines and methodologies. The
approach and methods used in this study pose no ethical issues and
comply with commonly accepted academic research protocols. Potential
bias may come from personal employment within the IC and previous
work as an intelligence analyst. However, to prevent confirmation bias the
primary author submitted the research to peer reviewers. The limitation
for this study included a fixed course duration, the sample size, and focus
only on the ODNI's legislated responsibilities regarding direct application
of standards. Other influences could influence the study if time allowed for
the use of additional case studies across other disciplines.

Analysis and Findings
The case studies below present a comparative analysis of the IC and the
other professions with examples supporting the proposed hypothesis.
Although few standards are comparable to the rigorous standards of the
American Bar Association (ABA) and American Medical Association
(AMA), intelligence analysts have the ODNI’s foundational initiatives to
set the general standards needed, process testing and certification of new
analysts, and control the administration of training and various
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educational avenues.46 According to Bruce and George, “the development
of professional standards, best practices, consensus statements, and
practice guidelines are the logical result of this risk mitigation," and the
disciplines of medicine, law, and other scholarly fields have reached a level
of development from previously unfettered practices that were performed
in unintended atmospheres.47 For the medical and legal professions,
practitioners must attain a level of education with basic skills and
knowledge for the new member to enter the profession. Thus, new
members, "use that academic credential as a way to regulate the expertise
of their practitioners."48 Declassified products represented a significant
comparison for previous approach methodology, and decades ago analysts
used few of the tradecraft elements currently employed today.
Simultaneously, “intelligence gaps and assumptions were noted in only
one of the declassified NIEs” (National Intelligence Estimates) during the
1960s and 1970s.49 Additionally, few IC analytical standards evaluation
programs were in existence at all before 2006. Besides the Sherman Kent
initiative, that later became the Center for the Study of Intelligence, a
greater effort is needed to transform the IC further using professional
business like methodology, which follow scientific methods of analysis.50
The following case studies expand on established business models that can
be used for the comparison.
Field of Medicine
Using medicine as an illustration can be complicated due to the extreme
level of correctness throughout training required, when compared to other
fields. However, this level of applied inspection represents a reasonable
and lofty goal long term and is an excellent starting point for potential
paths that ODNI has started taking regarding the IC.51 The medicine
analogy contained useful ideas and was a formal profession started
through the labors and successes of the AMA, "which facilitated the
accumulation of knowledge, structured improvement in techniques and
practices, and the transference of best practices from generation to
generation."52 This practice is an example of ODNI’s actions. By
structuring in comparison to the analogy, a building mechanism for
combining the IC and its separate agencies, various disciplines move
toward becoming a conglomerate, whole community in more than a name.
Marrin asserted, “the medical profession can bind its different specialties
together under the overall mission of improving the health of the patient
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and uses its code of ethics to do so.”53 The IC with guidance could easily
continue shifting toward this model.
A significant pillar of professionalism for becoming a discipline is the use
and ability to access a deep and thorough body of scholarship. The parallel
for intelligence may apply readily due to the very nature of urgency that
each group faces and as it "confront[s] difficult challenges of decision
making in life-or-death and high-risk situations."54 Other parallels include
the type of problems, the various processes, and applying different
solutions based on what information is available to the individual when a
decision is or needs to be made. Improvement requires learning from past
practices, understanding the various problems other professionals
confront and then being able to identify potential solutions. Intelligence
and medicine "entail similar cognitive approaches and are vulnerable to
similar failures, and the solutions that each has developed to overcome
those failures may have applicability in the other domain."55 Strategies are
used to remove bias, increase knowledge to improve decisions or analysis
and generate positive results or correct conclusions. Moreover, "best
practices can flow in both directions between professions since medicine
shares strong parallels with intelligence in the analytic process. Methods
for counteracting bias in intelligence analysis can be useful in medicine
and vice versa."56
Additionally, the intern and resident apprenticeship model is one that
both fields use, which inherently had failure in that faulty had no control
of preceptors in medicine during the late-nineteenth-century.57 However,
many subject-matter experts in intelligence still today also confront issues
with training new analysts in tradecraft while attempting to concurrently
carry out daily work with many demands of different levels of urgency due
to the generally unstructured teacher to student pairing.58 As a governing
body with oversight functions, the ODNI already has assisted in
compensating this gap or weaknesses through the tradecraft standards
and publications that assist in analytic skills and training aspects. For the
AMA, it was not until 1901 that these gaps began to be addressed with the
apprenticeship model, after creating the Council on Medical Education,
which generated “standardized education requirements” and developed
idyllic medical curriculums.59 In addition to medical professionals, lawyers
also represent a field in which the ODNI has a model of professionalism to
work toward.
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Field of Law
As a discipline, the law contains organized resources and a plethora of
research methods, with governing entities that have created professional
standards. The ethics enable proper education and "boards [are]
impaneled to assure that appropriate levels of education and competence
preceded admission to the bar earned the profession its modern-day
stature."60 Similar to the AMA, lawyers represent a relevant comparison to
IC analysts as each may be overwhelmed fighting against diverse and
assorted challenges when working against a world of external
organizations or governments in attempts to keep them unbalanced.61
Therefore, "the urgent call for systematizing both resources and methods
persist if intelligence analysis is to achieve 'discipline' status with all the
rigor, tenacity, and high standards such a designation connotes."62 For
lawyers, the codification and organization of its legal knowledge, coupled
with the development of methodologies for finding it began converting the
legal professionalism from “dilettantism to discipline.”63
This first began through the restoration of law to the educated and under a
regulation that became bar associations, especially the ABA in 1878. 64 In
similar size and same voice as the AMA, the ABA also has its principal
instructions in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.65 Previously, the
profession lacked uniformed and codified ethics or conduct guidelines that
existed for lawyers, with few organizations for the collective effort of
creating them. However, eventually, "the organization had successfully
drafted legislation, set standards for law reform, and…established the
requirements for legal education in America."66 The ABA’s Model Rules
embody many principles that the ODNI has put forth.67
The professionals themselves also parallel intelligence in many ways, such
as dealing with imperfect knowledge or misdirection, comparable to
human intelligence. Similarly, lawyers also have a complicated
relationship with scientific uncertainty. The method of expressing that
“subjective uncertainty” evolved into a "reasonable degree of precision:
namely, the standard of proof."68 To blend the two examples, medical
personnel's legal testimony also includes a level of uncertainty, which is
equivalent to intelligence and has generated a language equivalency of
assessment values into a formulation that, with some modifications, could
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easily be used in intelligence products. Examples include testifying that a
fact is a “reasonable medical certainty,” which is like “reasonable
indication” that analysts would use and have equivalent language for all
the degrees of certainty.69 The ODNI attempted to codify such language
through defining terms in ICD 203 and the degree of specific usage for
certainty are comparable when used consistently by members of different
agencies. Previously, when analysts used the same words, the meaning had
may have meant an entirely different percentage, out of 100, that reflected
the analysts’ confidence in the assessment.
Library Science, Curators, and Scholars
The final case includes various but similar fields of librarians, curators,
and academia. As Marrin described, these professions "may provide better
models for the professionalization of intelligence analysis, particularly in
terms of the profession's educational practices."70 The acquisition and
organization of resources that these fields use, or the employment of
systematic research and methodologies enable the analyst or a user to fully
gain the most from tools, which are at the center of a library's purpose.71
Similar to the medical and legal fields, librarians personify the example of
a discipline deeply rooted within the systems and repeatable
methodologies for training, gaining credentials, and “subspecialty
pursuit.”72 Compared to policymakers, who use a library as a perusing
customer, intelligence analysts act as a guide to the vast breadth and depth
of information across multiple channels to answer questions regarding
other countries' capabilities or limitations. The ODNI created the
semblance of standardization, comparable to cataloged systems, to
categorize types of threats and ensure analysts all understand the
tradecraft basics to assist in providing accurate assessments, timely, and
relevant. Bruce and George asserted, "frequently among the most
judicious, discerning, and skeptical consumers of information as well, a
good librarian is often a patron's best hope of finding exactly what he or
she needs in a sea of information where quality, value, and accessibility are
often unknowns."73 Over the decades, the librarian profession evolved and
arrived at its “present democratized iteration” in the late nineteenth
century.74 However, it has been based on the capability to effectively
convert information to those who need the information but are much less
familiar with the organization and find valuable answers from those
research findings.75
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 1

Curators in general are also akin to the level of direction that the ODNI has
set forth for the IC, because the IC is absent perfect systems or software
that can search only within portions of intelligence. An increased amount
of information to comb through can be challenging. However, by using the
tradecraft standards, analysts can structure the stream of various
information input so that "future IC analysts who are curators and brokers
of knowledge will be more valuable to policymakers than an army of
filterers awash in data."76 Much like an analyst, the position of a curator
with a gallery or other institution such as a museum, is to be informed on
the information collected, be able to articulate to those who are less
knowledgeable, and converse in a manner that increases interest in a topic
while providing insight based on previous records of sourcing.77 “Similarly,
an analyst-curator understands the range of opinion on a topic, the
viewpoints they bring, the relative track record of sources, and ways to
communicate all this information to customers and to drive insight.”78
Finally, the scholar analogy exemplifies strategic intelligence's very nature,
as it has no current accreditation standard for new members. As Gentry
described, "yes, a professor at a research university needs, for entry into
the club of tenured faculty, to have a terminal degree; be a good teacher;
have a good publication record with the promise of future research
successes, and adequately perform ‘service’ to the university and a
disciplinary specialty."79 However, beyond this general terminology and
criteria, which can also be applied to curators, professionals have vague
standards to the performance of individuals, even though many do
produce quality work. "Scholars often produce useful materials displaying
the intelligence product characteristics of predictive accuracy, uncertainty
reduction, and policy-relevance."80 Despite the lack of a significant
amount of “current intelligence” in this field, it still deals with the same
intellectual standards and peer review formatting with constant requests
from various clientele.81 ODNI's role plays at the heart of scholarship but
with a different subset of information not readily available outside the IC
or with the same standards in place following its issued guidelines and
policies.
Therefore, whether intentional or not, the various levels of the ODNI's
efforts that have led to standardization and IC-wide training efforts also
inherently improve intelligence by moving the IC toward its discipline and
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profession separate from others. Professionalization of intelligence
analysts creates a solidified method of transferring knowledge outside of
the apprenticeship model or a mentor aspect, which gives longevity and a
standard of ethics that new analysts can understand with little help. While
some aspects may not be getting the IC to the point of separating into a
profession, the steps taken already have benefited not only newcomers but
also those who have been in the field for decades and are familiar with the
various SATs or methodologies, which are used every day or just
infrequently as needed.

Conclusion
The discussion of the ODNI and its application of analytic standards beg
continued research and scholarship. The IC can become much closer to
occupations like those in the medical profession or lawyers. Using a
qualitative methodology and the multiple case study approach, to examine
previous research on the ODNI's implementation of the ICDs, the research
supported the hypothesis. Case studies demonstrated that, as with other
disciplines, the ODNI has moved the IC forward by improving some
aspects of analytical tradecraft through the creation of an environment
with standards that parallel other fields. Additional studies on the value of
ICDs within each agency may further this research. An effort to
determining to what extend individuals interact and apply standards
within the IC will also assist the greater intelligence community by helping
to create a systematic approach of implementing additional changes while
avoiding the difficulties of outliers. The analytical standards that can be
applied within all agencies determine the level of an impact this has on
analysis becoming a separate discipline altogether. This expansion is a
topic worth developing further into for IC members. The multiple case
studies detail that each profession can become established and better
through standards and oversight, which are the ODNIs responsibility for
the IC. This research provided insight into the current level of
professionalism, and examples which can be pulled upon for future IC
development. The ODNI has steered the IC in a new direction of creating
better assessments and understanding through its creation, and moving in
the direction of a maturing profession will likely continue improving
analysis.

118
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 1

Endnotes
“Objectivity,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed January 31, 2021,
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we-work/objectivity.
2 “What We Do,”, accessed January 31, 2021,
https://www.dni.gov/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Intelligence%20Community%20is,rela
tions%20and%20national%20security%20activities.
3 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security
Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2014), 232.
4 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, S.
2845, 108th Cong., (2004, as amended),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/s2845.
5 Richard A. Best Jr., Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), CRS Report No. R41295 (Washington, DC” Congressional
Research Service 2010), 5. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=22250.
6 EO 12333: United States Intelligence Activities, 3 CFR (1981, as amended),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html.
7 Philip H. J. Davies, “Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualizing
the Intelligence Community,” Public Policy and Administration 25, no. 1 (January
2010): 38-39, https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076709347073.
8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Analytic Standards, ICD 203
(Washington, DC: ODNI, 2007),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards%2
0pdf-unclassified.pdf.
9 Richard J. Harknett and James A. Stever, “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after
9/11,” Public Administration Review 71, no. 5 (2011): 705,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02409.x.
10 Gordon Lederman, "Making Intelligence Reform Work." The American Interest 4 no. 4
(2009): 25, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/03/01/making-intelligencereform-work/.
11 Marshall C Erwin, Intelligence Issues for Congress, Report No. RL33539 (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013): 3,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33539.
12 Best, Intelligence Reform, 1.
13 Harknett and Stever, “The Struggle to Reform,” 702.
14 Lauren C. Clark, “Statutory Struggles of Administrative Agencies: The Director of
National Intelligence and the Cia in a Post-9/11 World.” Administrative Law Review 62
no. 2 (2010): 548, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/admin62&i=549
15 Ten Years After 9/11: Is Intelligence Reform Working, Part I, 112 Cong. 1 (2011)
(statement of John C. Gannon, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/ten-years-after9/11-is-intelligence-reform-working-part-i
16 John D. Negroponte and Edward M. Wittenstein, “Urgency, Opportunity, and
Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004,” Yale Law & Policy Review 28, no. 2 (2009): 382,
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1596&context=ylpr.
17 Alexandru Marcoci, Mark Burgman, Ariel Kruger, Elizabeth Silver, Marissa McBride,
Felix Singleton Thorn, Hannah Fraser, Bonnie C Wintle, Fiona Fidler, and Ans
Vercammen, “Better Together: Reliable Application of the Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq US
Intelligence Tradecraft Standards Requires Collective Analysis.” Frontiers in
Psychology 9, no. 2634 (January 2019): 8, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02634.
18 Stephen Marrin, “Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts,” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 1 (2009): 139,
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600802486986.
19 Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 139.
1

119
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss1/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.1.1923

Reinhold et al.: Analytical Standards in the Intelligence Community

Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 139.
Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 139.
22 Tucker Higgins, “House Probes Security and Intelligence Failures in Deadly U.S.
Capitol Attack,” CNBC LLC, updated January 17, 2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/16/house-opens-probe-into-security-failures-indeadly-us-capitol-attack.html.
23 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 232.
24 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 232.
25 John A. Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved U.S. Intelligence Analysis?” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 4 (2015): 662,
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1050937.
26 Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between
Scholarship and Practice, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 137.
27 Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D, "Strategic Security as a New Academic Discipline," Journal of
Strategic Security 1, no. 1 (2010): 8, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.1.1.2.
28 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 290.
29 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 290.
30 Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011): 137.
31 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 314.
32 David Javorsek II and John Schwitz, “Probing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Human
Agency in Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 5 (2014): 648,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.834218.
33 Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 141.
34 Richard H. Immerman, “Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community’s Best
Kept Secret,” Intelligence & National Security 26 no. 2/3 (May 2011): 172,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559138.
35 James B. Bruce and Roger George, "Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis," Journal of
Strategic Security 8, no. 3: (Fall 2015): 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/19440472.8.3.1454.
36 Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved,” 638.
37 Stephen Coulthart, “Why Do Analysts Use Structured Analytic Techniques? An inDepth Study of an American Intelligence Agency,” Intelligence and National Security
31, no. 7 (March 2016): 933, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1140327.
38 Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved,” 654.
39 Alexandru Marcoci, Ans Vercammen, and Mark Burgman, “ODNI as an Analytic
Ombudsman: Is Intelligence Community Directive 203 up to the Task?,” Intelligence
and National Security 34, no. 2 (November 2018): 208,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1546265.
40 Immerman, “Transforming Analysis,” 163; Robert Cardillo, “A Cultural Evolution,”
Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 2,
https://www.cia.gov/static/0f9561e38ce57931a5e7c1fb409a59d4/A-CulturalEvolution.pdf.
41 Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved,” 641.
42 Kathleen Manning, Organizational Theory in Higher Education (New York:
Routledge, 2013).
43 Manning, Organizational Theory, 112.
44 Keith F. Punch, Developing Effective Research Proposals, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks:
Sage, 2016), 67.
45 Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik, Organization
Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth (New York: Routledge,
2007): 1
46 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 71.
47 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 57.
48 Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 140.
49 Jim Marchio, “Analytic Tradecraft and the Intelligence Community: Enduring Value,
Intermittent Emphasis,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 2 (March 2014):
20
21

120

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 1

169, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.746415.
Marchio, “Analytic Tradecraft,” 172.
51 Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 139.
52 Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 138-9.
53 Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 140.
54 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 60.
55 Stephen Marrin and Efren Torres, “Improving How to Think in Intelligence Analysis
and Medicine,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (May 2017): 657,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1311472.
56 Marrin and Torres, “Improving How to Think,” 657.
57 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 61.
58 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 61.
59 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 61.
60 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 60.
61 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 59-60.
62 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 60.
63 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 59.
64 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 58.
65 American Bar Association. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Chicago: American
Bar Association, 2020),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_co
ntents.html.
66 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 58.
67 Ronald Houston, “Archival Ethics and the Professionalization of Archival Enterprise,”
Journal of Information Ethics 22, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 50,
http://dx.doi.org/10.3172/JIE.22.2.46.
68 (Weiss 2008, 64). Charles Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and
Other Professions,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21,
no. 1 (June 2008): 64, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600701649312.
69 Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty,” 68.
70 Marrin, “Training and Educating,” 139.
71 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 63.
72 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 64.
73 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 63.
74 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 63.
75 Bruce and George, Analyzing Intelligence, 63.
76 Phil Nolan, “A Curator Approach to Intelligence Analysis,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, no. 4 (August 2012): 787,
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.678698.
77 Nolan, “A Curator Approach,” 790.
78 Nolan, “A Curator Approach,” 790.
79 John A. Gentry, “The ‘Professionalization’ of Intelligence Analysis: A Skeptical
Perspective,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 4
(June 2016): 663, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2016.1177393.
80 Gentry, “The ‘Professionalization’”, 663.
81 Gentry, “The ‘Professionalization’”, 663.
50

121
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss1/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.1.1923

